The pay day loan ordinance is financial legislation that imposes just civil sanctions. Consequently, it generally does not require the high level of quality that could be required for an ordinance that impinged on free message or any other right that is constitutional. Nonetheless, it’s clear both on its face and also as used. It forbids any pay day loan business from being available between 9 pm and 6 am. Plaintiff runs a pay day loan company that can’t be available throughout the prohibited hours, even though plaintiff is certainly not participating in the company of creating pay day loans or running a forex throughout that time. The ordinance will not prohibit “engaging in pay day loan tasks” during nighttime hours; it claims that the continuing company can not be available. Individuals of ordinary cleverness can comprehend the ordinance’s prohibition. Police force workers can enforce the ordinance: if a quick payday loan business is available after 9 pm or before 6 am, it’s in breach regarding the ordinance and at the mercy of a civil fine. The ordinance poses no risk of arbitrary or enforcement that is discriminatory.
Consequently, the conclusions We have reached plaintiff that is concerning federal constitutional *807 claims are similarly relevant to its state constitutional claims.
Because of its final argument, plaintiff contends that the ordinance is preempted by state legislation. Like plaintiff’s state constitutional dilemmas, this argument will not implicate any federal problem also it will be permissible to dismiss it on that ground, as opposed to work out supplemental jurisdiction on it.